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I. INTRODUCTION
Section 337(a) 1 of the Internal Revenue Code2 provides nonre1. I.R.C. § 337 states in part:
(a) GENERAL RULE-If, within the 12-month period beginning on the date on
which a corporation adopts a plan of complete liquidation, all of the assets of the
corporation are distributed in complete liquidation, less assets retained to meet claims,
then no gain or loss shall be recognized to such corporation from the sale or exchange
by it of property within such 12-month period.
Section 337 is included in Part 11 of Subchapter C, entitled "Corporate Liquidations."
Part II includes IR.C. §§ 331-346, which will be referred to in this Note as the liquidation
provisions.
2. All section references hereinafter are to the Internal Revenue Code of 1954.
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cognition treatment for a corporation that sells assets in the course
of a "complete liquidation." The reorganization provisions3 of the
Code allow a corporation that is a party to a reorganization to
recognize neither gain nor loss on the transfer of its assets for stock
or securities of another corporation that is a party to the reorganization. These same provisions also permit shareholders to exchange
their stock in the acquired corporation for securities in the acquiring
corporation without recognizing gain or loss. Congress, however, has
not specified precisely how the liquidation provisions and the reorganization provisions of the Code should interrelate. Traditionally
the courts have considered the liquidation and reorganization provisions to be completely complementary;5 thus, under this view, a
transaction in which a corporation distributes all its assets must be
either a liquidation or a reorganization but never both. Until recently no taxpayer had argued specifically that section 337 might
apply to prevent recognition of gain upon a sale that was a step in
a reorganization. In FECLiquidatingCorp. v. United States,I however, the Court of Claims faced the question whether section 337
might apply to prevent a corporation from recognizing gain on a sale
that was a step in a type C reorganization.7 Although this case of
first impression upholds the traditional view of mutual exclusivity
between the liquidation and reorganization provisions of the Code,
it raises several interesting questions concerning the interpretation
of the term "complete liquidation" as used in section 337. This Note
demonstrates that by applying the meaning of "complete liquidation" developed in several liquidation-reincorporation cases to the
obviously distinguishable facts of FEC, the Court of Claims has
adopted an unnecessarily restrictive view of section 337's "complete
liquidation" requirement.
II.

THE ORIGIN AND PURPOSE OF SECTION

337

Prior to 1954 a corporation that sold its assets and terminated
its operations faced the possibility of taxation at two levels: the
3. The reorganization provisions are embodied in Part IMof Subchapter C, entitled
"Corporate Organizations and Reorganizations." The sections included are §§ 351-368.
4. The term "party to a reorganization" is defined in § 368(b). Generally, it refers to
all corporations that are involved in a transaction that meets the requirements of § 368(a)(1).
5. See, e.g., Commissioner v. Berghash, 361 F.2d 257 (2d Cir. 1966); Joseph C. Gallagher, 39 T.C. 144 (1962).
6. 548 F.2d 924 (Ct. Cl. 1977).
7. A type C reorganization is an acquisition by one corporation of substantially all the
properties of another corporation, in exchange solely for voting stock of the acquiring corporation or its parent, or in exchange for such voting stock and a limited amount of "boot." §§
368(a)(1)(C), 368(a)(2)(B).
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corporation would recognize gain on the sale of its assets, and the
shareholders would recognize gain on the liquidating distribution.
The corporation could attempt to avoid this result by distributing
its assets to the shareholders and having the shareholders sell the
assets,8 but under Commissionerv. Court Holding Co.' the Service"0
was likely to restructure the transaction as a sale by the corporation
if the corporation was at all active in the sale negotiations. Although
United States v. CumberlandPublic Service Co."1 provided taxpayers with some hope of prevailing, the Court stated that whether the
corporation or the shareholders sold the assets was a question of fact
to be determined by considering the entire transaction. Thus shareholders could never be certain when their post-liquidation sale
might be attributed to the corporation because the question of who
had made the sale turned on fine distinctions in the amount of
corporate participation in the sale negotiations.
In response to this dilemma for taxpayers, Congress enacted
section 337, which provides that under certain circumstances a corporation may sell its assets and distribute the proceeds without
recognizing its gain or loss. The committee reports indicate that the
purpose of section 337 was to correct the formalistic problems presented by the Court Holding Co. and Cumberland Public Service
Co. cases, 12 but the section also did away with taxation of the corpo8. The distribution of a liquidating corporation's assets was not a taxable event to the
corporation. Treas. Reg. 103, § 19.22(a)-21 (1939); re-issued as Tress. Reg. I1, § 29.22(a)-20
(1943) and Treas. Reg. 118, § 39.22(a)-20 (1953). Section 336 serves this function under the
current Code.
9. 324 U.S. 331 (1945). In Court Holding Co., the corporation negotiated a sale of its
assets, but just before the oral agreement was reduced in writing, the shareholders learned of
the adverse tax consequences. On the following day the corporation declared a liquidating
dividend, and the shareholders made the sale. The Supreme Court imputed the sale to the
corporation.
10. The Internal Revenue Service.
11. 338 U.S. 451 (1950). In Cumberland, the shareholders first attempted to sell the
stock of their corporation, but the buyer refused. The shareholders then liquidated the corporation and sold its assets to the same buyer. The Supreme Court held that the sale had been
made by the shareholders.
12. H. R. REP. No. 1337, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 38-39, reprinted in [1954] U.S. CoDE
CoNG. & AD. NEws 4019, 4064, provides:
B. Liquidations (secs. 331-336)
(3) Court Holding Company-Your committee's bill eliminates questions arising
as a result of the necessity of determining whether a corporation in process of liquidating
made a sale of assets or whether the shareholder receiving the assets made the sale.
Compare Commissioner v. Court Holding Company (324 U.S. 331), with U.S. v. Cumberland Public Service Company (338 U.S. 451).
S. REP. No. 1622, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 48-49, reprinted in [1954] U.S. CoDE CONG. & AD.
Naws, 4623, 4679-80, states:
Your committee follows the House bill in eliminating questions arising as a result of the
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ration in certain transactions that clearly would have resulted in
corporate taxation without section 337. Because the section went so
far in preventing double taxation, a dispute arose over whether the
true purpose of section 337 was to correct the formality problems
raised by Court Holding Co. and CumberlandPublic Service Co. or
to eliminate one level of taxation. An example of this confusion is
Revenue Ruling 56-387,s in which the Service held that section 337
would not apply to a reorganization under Chapter X of the Bankruptcy Act. Since, under the facts presented in the ruling, the corporation was to distribute all its assets to creditors, rather than to its
shareholders who would have paid a capital gains tax thereon, the
Service determined that application of section 337 was inappropriate. The Service justified its determination by stating that
"Congress intended through section 337 of the 1954 Code to eliminate the double tax on gains realized from sales of corporate assets
during a period of liquidation, but did not intend to eliminate entirely the tax on such gains."" The Service later recognized that it
had erroneously interpreted the legislative intent behind section 337
and modified its prior ruling "to the extent that it implies that
section 337 of the Code will apply only where the liquidating distribution results in a tax at the shareholder level."' 5 Finally the United
States Supreme Court appeared to end the confusion when, in
8 it stated:
Central Tablet Manufacturing Co. v. United States,"
There is nothing in the legislative history indicating that § 337 was enacted in order to eliminate "double taxation" as such. Rather, the statute was
designed to eliminate the formalistic distinctions recognized and perhaps encouraged by the decisions in Court Holding and Cumberland. .

.

.The Stat-

ute was meant to establish a strict but clear rule, with a specific time limitation, upon which planners might rely and which would serve to bring certainty
and stability into the corporation liquidation area. 7
necessity of determining whether a corporation in process of complete liquidation made
a sale of assets or whether the shareholder receiving the assets made the sale. Compare
Commissioner v. Court Holding Company (324 U.S. 331) with U.S. v. Cumberland
Public Service Company (338 U.S. 451) .... The result of these two decisions is that
undue weight is accorded the formalities of the transaction and they, therefore, represent
merely a trap for the unwary.
13. 1956-2 C.B. 189.
14. Id.
15. Rev. Rul. 73-264, 1973-1 C.B. 178-79. This Ruling further stated: "Section 337 of
the Code was enacted by Congress to provide a result that would obviate the necessity of
determining whether a corporation in the process of complete liquidation made a sale of its
assets or whether the shareholders made the sale after receipt of the assets." Id. at 178.
16. 417 U.S. 673 (1974). CentralTablet is well known for its holding that an involuntary
conversion by fire can be a "sale or exchange" under § 337(a).
17. 417 U.S. at 682 (citations omitted). The Tax Court's most recent statement of
legislative purpose was in Lester J. Workman, 46 T.C.M. (P-H) 77,378 at 1532 (1977):
"Section 337 was enacted to eliminate the problem of determining whether the sale of an asset
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HL.

THE MEANING OF "COMPLETE LIQUIDATION"

Section 337(a) provides that a corporation adopting a plan of
complete liquidation and distributing all its assets' s in complete
liquidation within the twelve-month period beginning on the date
of the adoption of the plan shall recognize no gain or loss from the
sale or exchange of property within the twelve-month period. Thus
a threshold requirement for the applicability of section 337 to a
transaction is that there be a distribution in "complete liquidation." The Code, however, does not explain what constitutes a
"complete liquidation,"'" and the courts have been faced with defining this seemingly simple term.
The courts have been most active in defining "complete liquidation" in cases of liquidation-reincorporation. Typically, a
liquidation-reincorporation is an effort by shareholders to receive
from their corporation a distribution of accumulated earnings and
profits at capital gains rates while maintaining the corporation's
operating assets in corporate solution-commonly called a "bailout." Such transactions fall into two general patterns. Either the
original corporation liquidates, and its shareholders transfer all or
part of the operating assets to a second corporation under their
control, or the original corporation transfers all or part of its operating assets to a second corporation controlled by its shareholders and
then liquidates.2 1 Such liquidation-reincorporation transactions
obviously violate the policy behind allowing capital gains treatment
upon complete liquidation, for the corporation is, in effect, still in
existence. The Service, therefore, has attacked such transactions
under two theories: the reorganization theory and the nonliquidation theory.
of a corporation in the process of complete liquidation was by the corporation or by its
shareholders who had received it as a distribution in liquidation." That this statement of the
legislative purpose is correct has not been questioned until the government's argument in
FEC LiquidatingCorp. v. United States, discussed infra. § IV.'
18. Less those assets retained to meet claims. See note 1 supra.
19. The House version of the 1954 Code defined the term complete liquidation as follows: "[A] distribution shall be considered to be in complete liquidation of a corporation if
the distribution is in redemption of all its stock. . . and alr the property of the corporation
is distributed . . . ." H.R. 8300, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. § 336 (1954). This definition was not
enacted and, since it merely states the obvious, would have been of little value.
20. B. BITTKER & J. EUSTICE, FEDERAL hNcoME TAXATON OF CORPORAroNS AND
SHAREHOLDFMS
14.54 (3d ed. 1971). In either case the shareholders will pay only a capital
gains tax. Under the first pattern, the shareholders will pay a capital gain on the liquidating
distribution under § 331 and will recognize no gain upon a later incorporation under § 351.
Under the second pattern, the sale will be made under § 337, so the corporation recognizes
no gain, and the shareholders again get capital gains treatment upon the distributions under
§ 331.
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A. The ReorganizationTheory
In order to aid taxpayers, Congress enacted the reorganization
provisions, which grant tax free treatment on certain transactions
that otherwise would produce taxable gain or loss. 21 Nevertheless,

the Service has used the reorganization provisions 2 as one of its
tools to frustrate liquidation-reincorporations. The Service typically
argues that the court should collapse the two steps of liquidation
and reincorporation and view them as constituting one transaction. Furthermore, Congress implicitly has approved this tool.21
Thus, if a corporation sold all its assets to another corporation
owned by its shareholders and distributed the proceeds to its shareholders, the Service would contend that a reorganization-not a
"complete liquidation"-had occurred because the same shareholders still owned the same operating assets in corporate form; consequently, section 337 would not apply to the sale, and section 331
would not apply to the distributions.
Two such cases are Ralph C. Wilson 25 " and Davant v.
Commissioner.5 In Ralph C. Wilson, father and son taxpayers each
owned 50 percent of the stock of two corporations. One corporation
(corporation A) conducted a group insurance business, and the
other (corporation B) conducted a general insurance business. Upon
the father's decision to retire, corporation A transferred its group
insurance business to corporation B for cash and sold some appreciated securities to a third corporation (corporation C), also con21. H.R. REP. No. 179, 68th Cong., lst Sess. 13 (1924); S. REP. No. 398, 68th Cong.,
1st Sess. 14-15 (1924).
22. Specifically the Service has used types D and F reorganizations for this purpose.
Section 368(a)(1)(D) defines a type D reorganization as a transfer by a corporation of all or
part of its assets to a corporation that is controlled immediately after the transfer by the
transferor or its shareholders. The stock or securities of the controlled corporation must be
distributed during the reorganization in a transaction that qualifies under §§ 354-356. A type
F reorganization is "a mere change in identity, form, or place of organization, however
effected." § 368(a)(1)(F).
23. For a discussion of the theory behind this tool, see BrrrF & Eusrica, supra note
20, at 14.54.
24. The House version of the bill that became the 1954 Code contained a section providing for dividend treatment for shareholders who retained assets from a liquidationreincorporation whenever the shareholders of the liquidated corporation owned 50% or more
of the stock of the transferee corporation. H.R. 8300, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. § 357 (1954). The
Senate Finance Committee deleted this provision, explaining the deletion as follows:
[A]t the present time, the possibility of tax avoidance in this area is not sufficiently
serious to require a special statutory provision. It is believed that this possibility can
appropriately be disposed of by judicial decision or by regulation within the framework
of the other provisions of the bill.
H.R. REP. No. 2543, 83d Cong., 2d Sees. 41 (1954).
25. 46 T.C. 334 (1966).
26. 366 F.2d 874 (5th Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 386 U.S. 1022 (1967).
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trolled by the taxpayers. Corporation A then distributed all its assets, cash from the sales, to taxpayers in exchange for all their stock
in A. Although taxpayers treated the transaction as a section 337
sale followed by a complete liquidation under section 331, the Service determined that the transfer of A's group insurance business to
B constituted a type D reorganization and, therefore, that the distributions of A's assets to taxpayers were dividends under section
1
356(a) (2) to the extent of A's accumulated earnings and profits.
The court agreed that section 356(a)(2), rather than section 331,
applied to the distributions to the shareholders because the liquidation had been merely a step in a reorganization.2s Since section
356(a)(2) provides that the taxpayers were to recognize ordinary
income to the extent of A's earnings and profits, the court still had
to determine whether A's gain on the sale of stock to corporation C
should increase A's earnings and profits..29 The Service argued that
section 337 could not prevent corporation A from recognizing such
gain because no "complete liquidation" of A had occurred; the purported liquidation had constituted merely a step in the reorganization. The court agreed with the Service and held that section 337(a),
like section 331, was inapplicable since no "complete liquidation"
of corporation A had taken place."0
27. Generally, § 354(a)(1) governs the recognition of gain or loss to exchanging shareholders in a reorganization. That section provides that the shareholders will recognize no gain
or loss if, pursuant to a reorganization, they exchange their stock or securities in one corporation "solely for stock or securities" in a second corporation. Section 356(a)(1) allows the
distribution of some "boot" in a reorganization to avoid forcing the shareholders to lose all
nonrecognition privileges. But § 356(a)(2) states that if the distribution of "boot" has the
effect of a distribution of a dividend, the shareholder must recognize ordinary income on the
distribution up to his ratable share of the undistributed earnings and profits of the corporation. For a discussion of the concept of earnings and profits, see BrrrE & EusTicE, supra
note 20, at 7.03.
28. The parties in Wilson agreed that the first part of § 368(a)(1)(D) had been met, for
a corporation had transferred part of its assets to another corporation, and immediately after
the transfer the shareholders of the transferor controlled the transferee. The parties disagreed,
however, on whether the transaction satisfied the second requirement, which requires a distribution of the stock or securities of the transferee in a transaction qualifying under §§ 354356. The court found that a reorganization had occurred, however, determining that an actual
transfer was not necessary, for it would have been a "meaningless gesture." 46 T.C. at 344.
The court further found that the "substantially all" requirement of § 354(b)(1)(A) had been
met even though the transferor had kept a large amount of liquid assets. Id. at 345-48. Finally,
the court determined that the distribution had the effect of the distribution of a dividend
under § 356(a)(2). Id. at 349-51.
29. The Service conceded that A's gain on the sale of assets to B would not increase
A's earnings and profits because the nonrecognition provisions of § 361(b)(1)(A) applied to
that transfer.
30. 46 T.C. at 352. Taxpayers rested their entire case on their contention that no
reorganization had occurred; they conceded that "section 337 is inapplicable where the purported liquidation was merely a step in a reorganization." Id.
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Davant v. Commissioner evidences how far taxpayers have
been willing to go in attempting to take advantage of the tax avoidance possibilities of reincorporations. The taxpayers in Davant,who
controlled corporations
A and B, sold all their A stock to a
31
"strawman

and reported capital gain on the sale. The strawman

then had A sell all its assets to B, and the strawman liquidated A,
using its assets, cash, to pay off the loan he had taken for the
purchase price of A's stock. Thus, after the transaction was complete, taxpayers still controlled the operating assets that had belonged to A, and those assets were still in corporate solution in B,
yet those taxpayers had "bailed out" 200,000 dollars of earnings and
profits at capital gains rates. Predictably, the Service contended
that the transaction constituted a reorganization and that the taxpayers should report their gain as a dividend.32 The taxpayers responded that even if the court considered the "strawman" to have
been merely a conduit, who should be disregarded as their agent,
the court still should allow taxpayers capital gains treatment under
section 331 because taxpayers had met each of its requirements.
Taxpayers argued further that section 337 should prevent recognition of the corporation's gain, for each of its requirements also had
been fulfilled. The court, noting that "it is hard to imagine a transaction more devoid of substance," 3s held that both a D and an F
reorganization had taken place and that neither section 331 nor
section 337 applied because no "complete liquidation" had occurred.
Thus the cases appeared to hold uniformly that section 337
should not apply to a sale of assets by one corporation to another
corporation controlled by the same shareholders when that sale was
merely a step in a reorganization. The question remained, however,
whether section 337 should ever apply to a sale in the course of a
reorganization if made to an unrelated third party. Three cases
seem to answer in the negative. Retail Properties,Inc. 31 and James
Armour, Inc. 31 presented similar factual situations. In each case the

same shareholders controlled two corporations, A and B.11 In each
case corporation A sold part of its assets to an unrelated third party
31. The "strawman" was the son of the taxpayer's attorney; thus he obviously was not
a bona fide purchaser. All the steps described occurred in less than one hour.
32. The Service contended, and the court held, that the dividend to the shareholders
should be measured by the earnings and profits of both corporations.
33. 366 F.2d at 879.
34. 33 T.C.M. (P-H) 64,245 (1964).
35. 43 T.C. 295 (1964).
36. In Retail Properties,one corporation was a wholly owned subsidiary of the other.
In James Armour, the shareholders owned brother-sister corporations.
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for cash and then transferred its remaining operating assets to corporation B. Corporation A then made a liquidating distribution to
its shareholders, who claimed that section 337 protected corporation
A from recognizing its gain on the sales and that section 331 provided for capital gains treatment to the shareholders on the liquidating distributions. Both in Retail Properties and in James
Armour, the court found that a type D reorganization had occurred.
The court in each case also assumed, without discussion, that because section 331 did not apply, section 337 also should not apply 7
In Werner Abegg, 5 however, the court faced squarely the issue
whether section 337 could allow a corporation to recognize no gain
on a sale to a third party during a reorganization. Abegg owned all
the stock in an American personal holding company (corporation
H). Corporation H adopted a plan of complete liquidation and sold
its assets, cash, securities, receivables, and motion picture rights, to
an unrelated third party, realizing a gain. Corporation H then distributed its assets to Abegg in complete liquidation. Five months
later Abegg contributed these same assets to C, a Panamanian corporation, in exchange for 100 percent of C's stock. Once again the
Commissioner determined that the transactions, taken together,
constituted a type D reorganization and that section 337 should not
apply to H's gain on the sale to the third party, presumably because
no "complete liquidation" had occurred. As in prior cases, the taxpayer argued that the transaction was not a reorganization and
conceded that if a reorganization had occurred, section 337 would
not apply?' The court, holding that a type D reorganization had
occurred, stated:
Since a reorganization occurred, the tax consequences are to be governed
by the provisions of the Code dealing with reorganizations, sections 354 to 368,
and not those dealing with liquidations, sections 331 to 346 .

. .

. It follows

that [H corporation's] gain. . . realized upon the sale of stock is not subject
to nonrecognition under section 337 as in a liquidation, but is to be recognized
under section 1002.40

The above language clearly implies that section 337 can never apply
37. Apparently neither taxpayer raised the issue whether § 337 might apply even
though § 331 did not, for neither decision discussed the application of § 337 to the sale to the
third parties. Possibly the taxpayers believed that they could win on the reorganization issue
and did not want to weaken that argument by discussing what tax treatment should result if
the court found that a reorganization had occurred. Also in each case the gain on the sale to
the third party was small relative to the total tax liability at issue.
38. 50 T.C. 145 (1968), aff'd 429 F.2d 1209 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 1008 (1970).
39. Taxpayer's primary argument was that the reorganization provisions should not
apply to a personal holding company. The court rejected this argument.
40. 50 T.C. at 157.
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to a sale made as part of a reorganization, presumably because the
reorganization provisions require a continuity of interest, which is
inconsistent with section 337's requirement that a "complete liquidation" occur.
B.

The NontiquidationTheory

The second tool that the Service has used in attacking reincorporation transactions is the so-called "nonliquidation" theory.41
This theory is like the reorganization theory in that the Service
asserts that the corporation has not completely liquidated, notwithstanding the fact that the corporation has distributed all of its assets' The nonliquidation theory differs from the reincorporation
theory in that the Service does not face the technical difficulties of
proving that a reorganization has occurred. 2 The Service has argued
that no complete liquidation has occurred in several cases in which
the shareholders of the transferor corporation owned a large percentage of the transferee corporation, which continued to use the transferred assets in the same business enterprise.,' Thus the nonliquidation theory treats the two corporations as one and treats any distribution to its shareholders as a dividend,4 redemption," or partial
liquidation."
In contrast to the success the Service has enjoyed with the
reorganization theory, the nonliquidation theory has not been
4" one corporation (A) sold
widely accepted. 4 In Joseph C. Gallagher,
all its operating assets to another corporation (B) and then liquidated. The shareholders of A, who owned 73 percent of the stock of
B, claimed that section 331 applied to the liquidating distributions.
See Bn'rnER & EUSTICE, supra note 20, at 14.54, n.216.1 (1978) (Supp. No. 1).
42. The requirements of § 368(a)(1)(D) have been especially difficult for the Service to
prove in reorganization theory cases. That section requires a "transfer" of stock or securities
from the acquiring corporation in a transaction qualifying under § 354, § 355, or § 356. Even
though the courts often have been quite liberal, see note 28 supra,the burden of proving these
technical requirements is a difficult one to carry.
43. In the liquidation-reincorporation cases decided under the reorganization theory, no
court has found that a reorganization occurred unless the shareholders of the transferor
corporation owned at least 80% of the acquiring corporation. The "nonliquidation" theory has
potential to be used when continuity of shareholder interest is somewhat lower.
44. Section 301 governs dividend treatment on distributions of property from a corporation to its shareholders.
45. Section 302 provides rules for treating distributions as redemptions.
46. Section 346 defines "partial liquidation" and governs the tax treatment of distributions made in partial liquidation.
47. To date the only case to accept the nonliquidation theory is Telephone Answering
Serv. Co. v. Commissioner,63 T.C. 423 (1974), aff'd per curiam, 546 F.2d 423 (4th Cir. 1976),
cert. denied, 431 U.S. 914 (1977).
48. 39 T.C. 144 (1962).
41.
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The Commissioner argued that a "complete liquidation" had not
occurred and, alternatively, that the transaction constituted a reorganization. The court refused to recognize the "nonliquidation"
theory, stating: "The concept of a continuation of the existing business through a section 331 liquidation, coupled with an intercorporate transfer, falls into the general area of corporate reorganizations,
so that it is in the so-called reorganization sections, if anywhere,
that we should expect it to be dealt with."49 The court determined
that since the transaction was not a reorganization, it was necessarily a "complete liquidation." Thus the Gallaghercourt denied the
existence of any middle ground between the liquidation and reorganization provisions, and subsequent cases generally have upheld
the Gallaghercourt's theory.51
Some tension concerning the nonliquidation theory has always
existed in the Tax Court, however, as Judge Tannenwald's dissent
in Estate of Henry P. Lammerts52 indicates. Judge Tannenwald
disagreed with the majority's thesis "that a distribution, which is
in form accomplished as part of a complete liquidation, must be
treated as a section 331 distribution unless the entire transaction
can be fitted within the definition of a reorganization contained in
section 368(a). 53 Congress allowed shareholders to receive capital
gains treatment for gains on distributions in complete liquidation,
49. Id. at 157. The court continued:
The fact that the assets of a business are transferred to a new corporation does not
by itself change the effect of the liquidation of the original corporation. . . . So that it
is only the continuance of the business in a new corporation, preponderantly owned by
the shareholders of the old, upon which respondent can rely for his first contention [the
nonliquidation theory].
But, generally speaking, it is exactly where the same enterprise is in essence wholly
or partly continued even after some more or less radical change in its organization or
conduct that it is the purpose of the so-called "reorganization" section of the law to
operate.
Id.
50. For a discussion of the existence of a middle ground between the reorganization and
liquidation provisions, see Note, New Answers to the Liquidation-ReincorporationProblem,
76 COLum. L. Rv. 268 (1976).
51. E.g., Breech v. United States, 439 F.2d 409 (9th Cir. 1971); Simon v. United States,
402 F.2d 272 (Ct. Cl. 1968); Commissioner v. Berghash, 361 F.2d 257 (2d Cir. 1966); Lester
J. Workman, 46 T.C.M. (P-H) 77,378 (1977).
52. 54 T.C. 420, 447 (1970). Henry P. Lammerts owned 100% of the stock in "Old"
Lammerts, Inc., an automobile dealership. Upon Lammerts' death, his will provided that Old
Lammerts, Inc. should be liquidated, with 25% of its operating assets going to Lammerts' son
and 75% going to Lammerts' wife. After this distribution the son and widow formed "New"
Lammerts, Inc. Each transferred the operating assets to the new corporation in exchange for
stock. Thus the operating assets of the new corporation were almost identical to those of the
old corporation, and the business of the corporation had not been interrupted.
53. Id. at 447.
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Judge Tannenwald asserted, because such a liquidation is analogous to a sale or exchange of stock. When, however, "complete continuity of ownership, as well as complete continuity of business,"5
exists between the two corporations involved, as in Lammerts,
Judge Tannenwald believed that the analogy no longer was valid
and therefore that section 331 should not apply. Thus he would have
held in Lammerts, that a "complete liquidation" had not occurred
for purposes of section 331, even though he agreed that no reorganization had taken place.55
Finally, in 1974, the Service gained its first nonliquuidation
theory victory in Telephone Answering Service Co. v.
Commissioner." Judge Tannenwald, writing for the majority,
adopted the reasoning of his dissent in Lammerts. The taxpayer
corporation (T-1) owned all of the stock of both H corporation and
N corporation. T-1 both provided services to the two subsidiaries
and operated its own telephone answering business. After adopting
a plan of complete liquidation, taxpayer sold all of the stock of H
at a substantial gain to an unrelated third party. Taxpayer then
created a new subsidiary (T-2) to which T-1 transferred its directly
operated business in exchange for all of T-2's stock. The shareholders of T-1 then liquidated T-1, receiving the stock of both N and T2 and the cash T-1 had received from the sale of H. T-2 then
changed its name to T-1, allowing for no interruption in business.
The only significant difference in the ownership of T-2, as compared
with T-1, was that one shareholder who had owned 15.7 percent of
T-1 transferred all his T-2 stock to N for certain of N's assets.
Taxpayer claimed that these steps constituted a complete liquidation and, therefore, that section 337 precluded it from recognizing
gain on the sale of the H stock. Although the Service argued that a
type D reorganization had occurred, the court never reached that
issue, finding instead that the continuation of T-l's business by
largely the same shareholders was inconsistent with the "complete
liquidation" requirement of section 337.' The majority noted, how54. Id. at 450.
55. Judge Tannenwald distinguished both Joseph C. Gallagher, and Commissioner v.
Berghash, because in Gallagher a "substantial minority interest" had left the corporate
enterprise, and in Berghash "half of the stock of the new corporation was owned by a new
investor." Thus in each case a "meaningful change" in ownership had occurred "so that the
successor corporation could not easily be equated to the predecessor corporation." Id. at 452.
56. 63 T.C. 423 (1974), affd per curiam, 546 F.2d 423 (4th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 431
U.S. 914 (1977) [hereinafter referred to as TASCO].
57. Had the court attempted to decide whether a reorganization had occurred, it would
have faced the issue of whether "substantially all" of T-l's assets had been reincorporated
in T-2. It is unclear whether the assets of T-I's subsidiaries should have been counted in the
"substantially all" requirement of § 354.

1978].

SECTION 337 SALES

ever, that its decision dealt only with the question of the corporation's nonrecognition of gain, not with the appropriate tax treatment for the shareholders. 8 This comment by the court indicates
that "complete liquidation," when used in section 337, may mean
something different than those same words as used in section 331.11
Thus, at a time when most courts and taxpayers assumed that
section 337 and the reorganization provisions were mutually exclusive, TASCO reopened some very interesting questions about the
relationship between those provisions." Since Gallagherand its progeny asserted that a liquidation-reincorporation must be treated as
a complete liquidation unless it meets the requirements of a reorganization, TASCO's direct conflict with Gallagher indicates that
the traditional approach to the relationship between the liquidation
provisions and the reorganization provisions may not be as selfevident as was once thought. Although the actual holding in
TASCO indicates that the "complete liquidation" requirement of
section 337 is more complete than that of section 331, its revolutionary rationale raises many questions about the term "complete liquidation," such as whether section 337's "complete liquidation" ever
can be less complete than that of section 331. TASCO's failure to
follow prior case law, therefore, appears to reopen consideration of
whether a "complete liquidation" for purposes of section 337 might
occur in certain types of reorganizations.
IV. FEC Liquidating Corp. v. United States
A.

The Transaction

On September 15, 1967, Fanon Electronic Industries" (taxpayer) entered into a plan of reorganization with Whittaker Corporation whereby taxpayer would transfer all its assets to a subsidiary
of Whittaker in exchange for Whittaker voting stock and the assumption by Whittaker of certain liabilities. Under the plan taxpayer retained obligations to purchase outstanding warrants against
its stock and to pay certain liabilities that Whittaker would not
58. 63 T.C. at 432 n.4.
59. See Judge Sterrett's dissenting opinion, 63 T.C. at 436.
60. In Rev. Rul. 76-429, 1976-2 C.B. 97, the Service ruled that a liquidationreincorporation of a subsdiary by a parent was a partial, rather than a complete, liquidation.
The Service's theory was the same as the theory adopted in the TASCO decision. Both
TASCO and this ruling rest upon the premise that because some of the assets remained in
corporate solution controlled by the same shareholders, the transaction could, not be a complete liquidation. The ruling denied nonrecognition under § 332 as TASCO denied nonrecognition under § 337.
61. Fanon later changed its name to FEC Liquidating Corporation.
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assume. The acquisition agreement stated that taxpayer and Whittaker were adopting a plan of reorganization under section
368(a)(1)(C). 2 Taxpayer adopted a plan of complete liquidation on
December 10, 1967, and five days later transferred its assets to
Whittaker's subsidiary for Whittaker stock. In order to obtain cash
to pay its remaining liabilities and to purchase the outstanding
warrants, taxpayer sold some of the Whittaker shares to an unrelated third party. On December 10, 1968, taxpayer distributed the
remaining Whittaker stock and dissolved. Taxpayer reported the
gain it realized on the sale of the Whittaker stock but later amended
its return and sued for a refund, claiming that such gain need not
have been recognized under section 337 since the sales occurred
pursuant to a plan of complete liquidation and all taxpayer's assets
3
had been distributed to its shareholders within twelve months A
B.

The Arguments and Opinion

Unlike the reincorporation cases, in which the issue was
whether a particular transaction was really a liquidation or a reorganization, both parties in FEC agreed that a type C reorganization
had occurred. Although taxpayer admittedly had met the literal
requirements of section 337, the United States contended that taxpayer could not invoke both section 337 and section 36164 in the
same transaction because the liquidation and reincorporation provisions are mutually exclusive. The government argued that because
the continuity of interest requirement of a reorganization is inconsistent with the idea of complete liquidation, a given transaction
may be either a liquidation or a reorganization but never both. 5 The
62. See note 7 supra.
63. Actually, some of the shares were distributed to a bank as assignee of shareholders
who could not be located. Treas. Reg. § 1.337-2(b) provides that the twelve-month distribution requirement of § 337 can be met by distributing assets to an assignee for the benefit of
unlocated shareholders.
64. Under § 361(a), a corporation that is a party to a reorganization does not recognize
gain or loss if, as part of the reorganization, it exchanges property for stock or securities in
another corporation that is a party to the reorganization. Thus Fanon recognized no gain on
its transfer of assets to Whittaker.
65. Note that in TASCO the Service argued that a transaction maybe a liquidation or
a reorganization or, under certain circumstances, neither. That argument was totally inconsistent with the traditional view. The decision in TASCO adopted the Service's argument,
indicating that the Tax Court was rejecting the traditional approach. Later, in FEC, the
taxpayer argued that a transaction may be a liquidation or a reorganization or, under certain

circumstances, both. This argument does not seem wholly inconsistent with the break in
tradition in TASCO. Yet the Service contended in FEC that, although TASCO correctly
demolished the traditional view that a transaction must be either a liquidation or a reorganization, the traditional view still should remain intact concerning whether a transaction may
be both a liquidation and a reorganization.
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United States stated that since the transaction concededly was a
reorganization, Part HI of Subchapter C6 should control its tax
consequences. Thus the United States argued that section 337
"applies only in connection with 'complete liquidations' which are
recognized as such for tax purposes under Section 331(a)(1) ....
[A] distribution of assets incident to a reorganization is not recognized as a complete liquidation either for purposes of Sections
331(a)(1) or 337(a)."87 In support of its argument that section 337
can only be effective in conjunction with section 331, the United
States looked to the legislative history of section 337. It interpreted
that history to show that Congress intended section 337 to apply
only in situations in which the shareholders recognize income upon
the liquidating distribution, for although Congress intended to do
away with one level of taxation, according to the government, it did
not intend to allow assets to be distributed and escape taxation at
both levels. 8
Taxpayer, on the other hand, denied that the concurrent operation of sections 337 and 361 offends any tax policy or express statutory provisions. Taxpayer agreed that in the type C reorganization
involved, section 354 conflicted with and overrode section 331, and
section 358 conflicted with and overrode section 334, but the taxpayer argued that since no reorganization section conflicted with
section 337, that section should apply. Taxpayer distinguished the
line of reincorporation cases on the ground that in those cases, the
same shareholders had controlled both corporations before and after
the transfer, but in the FEC transaction Fanon's shareholders had
relinquished control of the assets transferred to Whittaker.
Agreeing that prior reincorporation cases were distinguishable
on their facts, the court nevertheless took note that in all those cases
the transaction involved had been treated either as a liquidation or
a reorganization, but never as both." The court admitted that the
shareholders of Fanon had not retained control over the assets
transferred, but since those shareholders maintained a proprietary
interest in Whittaker, the court stated that they had "shared in
control to the extent their voting rights empowered them."7 Thus
66. §§ 351-368.
67. Cross-Motion of the United States for Partial Summary Judgment and Brief in
Support Thereof and in Opposition to Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment at 13-14,
FEC Liquidating Corp. v. United States, 548 F.2d 924 (Ct. Cl. 1977) [hereinafter referred to
as Defendant's Brief].
68. In essence, the United States resurrected the argument that § 337's purpose was to
eliminate one level of taxation. See notes 12-17 supra and accompanying text.
69. The FEC decision does not cite TASCO.
70. 548 F.2d at 927. The facts involved in FEC certainly were unlike those in the
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the court's decision that a section 337 sale can never be a part of
a reorganization rested entirely upon the traditional interpretation
of section 337's "complete liquidation" requirement.
V.

WAS

FEC CORRECT?

FECLiquidatingCorp. holds that the reorganization provisions
completely preempt the liquidation provisions; thus the transferor
corporation can never receive nonrecognition treatment under section 337 on a sale of assets to a third party if such sale is made as a
step in a reorganization. The remainder of this Note will demonstrate that neither the legislative history of section 337 nor prior case
law dictates the conclusion reached in FEC. Furthermore, at least
one policy argument supports a conclusion contrary to that reached
in FEC, for the traditional understanding of the relationship between section 337 and the reorganization provisions may bring
about undesirable results in some cases by reinstating the very problem that section 337 was. intended to remedy.
A. Legislative Intent
(1) Congressional Consideration of the FEC Issue
The legislative history does not indicate that Congress specifically considered the possibility that a sale under section 337 might
exist as part of a reorganization. When Congress chose the term
"complete liquidation," it apparently meant to convey only the idea
that section 337 would not apply to a partial liquidation under
section 336; 7' to qualify, therefore, a corporation must distribute all,
as opposed to part, of its assets. 72 Furthermore, section 337(c) lists
instances in which section 337(a) should not apply. One conspicuous
omission from subsection (c) is the case in which a reorganization
occurs. This omission tends to indicate that Congress consciously
omitted such a specific exception to the application of section 337(a)
either because such an exception was too obvious to require articulation, the traditional view, or because such an exception was not
desired.73
reincorporation cases that utilized type D and F reorganizations to abort tax-avoidance
schemes, for the shareholders of Fanon ended up owning less than 20% of the outstanding
Whittaker stock. Thus they hardly continued to control the transferred assets.
71. Note that § 336 applies to both complete and partial liquidations.
72. An example of a case in which § 337 did not apply because the corporation did not
distribute all its assets is Rev. Rul. 74-544, 1974-2 C.B. 108.
73. An amendment that would make § 337 specifically inapplicable to any transfer
under § 368 has been recommended but was never enacted. See HousE COMM. ON WAYS AND
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(2) The Government's Reading of the Legislative History
The United States asserted in FEC that Congress intended
section 337 to apply only to those sales prior to liquidations to which
section 331 applies; 7 thus for section 337 to apply, the shareholders
would have to recognize gain or loss on the liquidating distribution.
In order to support its view, the United States resurrected the theory
that the purpose of section 337 was to eliminate one, but only one,
level of taxation. The government cited the following Ways and
Means Committee Report as authority for its position that section
337 applies only if the shareholders recognize gain:7 5
B. Liquidations(secs. 331-336)
(3)

Court Holding Company.-

. . .

In order to eliminate questions

resulting only from formalities, your committee has provided that if a
corporation in process of liquidation sells assets there will be no tax at
the corporate level, but any gain realized will be taxed to the distributeeshareholder, as ordinary income or capital gain depending on the character of the asset sold'

(3) The Government's Theory Rebutted
The government's reliance on the Committee Report is misplaced. The House version of section 33777 sought to avoid the Court
Holding Co.-CumberlandPublic Service Co. problem in a manner
quite different from section 337 as enacted. It provided that the
corporation would not recognize gain upon a sale of assets prior to
liquidation. It went on to provide, however, that the shareholders
would recognize the gain realized by the corporation on the sale as
ordinary income or capital gain, depending on the character of the
asset the corporation had sold. 78 The shareholders also would obtain
a step-up in the basis of their stock equal to the gain they recognized. 7' Similarly, if the shareholders themselves sold the assets, the
character of the gain recognized again would be determined by reference to the character of the assets in the hands of the corporation.
The House version provided that the shareholders would recognize
no gain at the time of distribution to them of inventory assets, but
MENs, 86TH. CONG., IST. SESS., REVISED REPORT ON CORPORATE DTRIBUTIONS AND

ADjusr

rrs 56 (Comm. Print 1959).

74. Defendant's brief at 23.
75. Id. at 22.
76. H.R. REP. No. 1337, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 38-39, reprintedin [1954] U.S.
& AD. NEws 4019, 4064.
77. H.R. 8300, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. §§ 332-333 (1954).

78. Id.
79. Id.

CODE CONG.
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would have a carryover basis, realizing ordinary income only when
they sold the inventory. Furthermore, the House version required
that the shareholder recognize the corporation's gain even if the
shareholder was a tax-exempt organization."
The version of section 337 that Congress finally enacted
adopted a completely different approach. It does not explicitly require that the shareholders recognize gain as a condition of nonrecognition treatment at the corporate level. The tax impact upon the
corporation is independent of the tax treatment of the shareholders.8 ' Thus the enacted version of section 337 does not require exempt organizations that are shareholders to pay a tax in a section
337 liquidation. Although the government's contention that the corporation's nonrecognition under section 337 is conditioned on recognition of tax by the shareholders is unquestionably logical, it was
not the plan ultimately adopted by Congress. The presence or absence of taxation at the shareholder level simply is irrelevant for
purposes of section 337. Furthermore, even the House Bill, which
allowed the corporation nonrecognition treatment only at the cost
of recognition by the shareholders, did not require the shareholder
recognition to occur at the time of distribution. In the case in which
a corporation distributes assets to its shareholders, the House Bill
required only that the shareholders take a carry-over basis in the
corporate assets, with recognition occurring upon final disposition
of the assets by the shareholders.
(4) "Complete Liquidation" in Sections 332 and 333
Besides the legislative history, other evidence supports the conclusion that Congress did not mean the term "complete liquidation"
always to require a dissolution of the business in corporate form.
The term "complete liquidation" appears in several sections of the
Code: sections 331, 332, 333, and 337 to name a few. The traditional
view of the "complete liquidation" requirement of section 337, and
the view adopted in FEC, indicates that section 337 can never apply
to a reorganization because in a reorganization no intent to wind up
the business of the corporation exists; thus there is no "complete
liquidation." The term "complete liquidation" as used in section
80. H.R. REP. No. 1337 at A106-09, reprinted in [1954] U.S. CODE CoNG. & AD. NEws
at 4243-44.
81. Section 337 as enacted pertains only to tax effects upon the corporation and does
not address the tax treatment of shareholders who receive distributions from the corporation
when it liquidates. Section 331 deals with such distributions. If § 331 is preempted by § 354
because the distribution was made as part of a reorganization, as in FEC,there is no statutory
reason why § 337 nevertheless may not apply at the corporate level.
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332,2 however, envisions a continuation of the corporate business by
the parent corporation, and that term in section 33383 permits the
shareholders to continue the corporate business even though the
shareholders may themselves be corporations. Must "complete liquidation" in all these sections require doing away with the corporate
form of doing business? Arguably, the term "complete liquidation"
in all sections of the Code does require such a termination of the
corporation. Under this rationale a distribution of corporate assets
under section 332 or section 333 to shareholders that themselves are
corporations would constitute a "complete liquidation" because
those shareholder corporations then would hold the assets only in
their capacities as shareholders and not, as in a reorganization, in
a modified corporate form. Such a theory, however, is completely
inconsistent with the reorganization theory cases, which disregarded
mere changes in corporate shells in order to be consistent with economic realities. Thus, in an economic sense, the term "complete
liquidation," at least when used in sections 332 and 333, apparently
may include a continuation of assets in corporate form. 4
(5)

Different Meanings of "Complete Liquidation"

Furthermore, as TASCO implies, the term "complete liquidation" might have different meanings in different sections of the
Code. Language in several cases appears to support this view. In
American Manufacturing Co.,8 5 a parent corporation owned two
subsidiary corporations, D (domestic subsidiary) and F (foreign
subsidiary). Corporation D sold its operating assets to F for cash and
liquidated into the parent, while F continued the business of D.
82. Section 332 allows nonrecognition treatment to a parent corporation upon the liquidation of its 80% owned subsidiary.
83. Section 333 allows nonrecognition of gain to a qualified electing shareholder on the
complete liquidation of a domestic corporation. See Brrrxn & EusrcE, supra note 20, at
11.21.
84. Note, however, that § 337(c)(2) excludes sales of assets by a subsidiary prior to a §
332 liquidation from § 337(a)'s nonrecognition provision. Section 337(a) is inapplicable presumably because Congress did not want the gain to escape taxation at both levels. There are,
however, two exceptions to this exception. First, § 337(a) applies to the pre-acquisition
appreciation of assets sold by a subsidiary prior to a § 332 liquidation if the parent's basis is
determined by § 334(b)(2). Second, the Tax Reform Act of 1976 amended § 337(c)(2) so that
§ 337(a) applies to a sale of assets by a subsidiary prior to its liquidation under § 332 if its
parent also is completely liquidated within twelve months.
The structure of § 337(c)(2), therefore, tends to support the traditional view that § 337(a)
should apply only if gain is recognized by the shareholders. On the other hand, the reader
should note with interest that Congress meticulously made § 337(a) inapplicable to pre-§ 332
liquidations but refused to enact a similar exception in cases of reorganizations. See note 73
supra.
85. 55 T.C. 204 (1970).
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Although the parent claimed that section 332 applied to the liquidation, the Service argued, and the Tax Court held, that section 332
could not apply because this series of steps constituted a D reorganization and, therefore, no "complete liquidation" had occurred. In a
dissenting opinion, Judge Quealy stated that although the reorganization provisions preempt section 331, they should not necessarily
preempt section 332. Judge Quealy noted that the reorganization
provisions often are applied to a section 331 liquidation followed by
a reincorporation in order to prevent a "bail-out" of earnings and
profits by the shareholders. Such a "bail-out," he stated, "goes
against the basic tenet of subchapter C that a mere readjustment
of continuing interest of the individual shareholders under the corporate form does not give rise to a sale or exchange of a capital
asset.""6 According to Judge Quealy, however, this same policy does
not apply to liquidations under section 332, for "[i]t was never
contemplated as a prerequisite to a liquidation under this section
that there be a discontinuation of the business in the corporate
7
8

form."
The court in Eastern Color Printing Co. 8 went even further

than Judge Quealy, stating that a single transaction may be both a
"complete liquidation" under section 332 and a reorganization
under section 368(a)(1)(F) for different purposes. In that case the
court held that the liquidation of taxpayer's subsidiary into the
taxpayer also constituted a type F reorganization for purposes of
using net operating loss carrybacks under section 381(b). The court
clearly stated that "the fact that a transaction meets the provisions
of section 332 does not mean that it may not be treated under
section 381(b) as a reorganization within the provisions of section
368(a) (1)(F) if it also meets the provisions of that section."8 These
cases clearly indicate that the meaning of "complete liquidation"
in section 332 is not identical to the meaning of that same term
when used in section 331. Thus they also support the theory that
section 337's "complete liquidation" requirement also may be less
severe than section 331's.
86. Id. at 235.
87. Id. Judge Quealy went on to state, "Therefore the major abuse in the reincorporation area is not present in a section 332 liquidation ....
Id. at 237.
88. 63 T.C. 27 (1974).
89. Id. at 35. See also Kansas Sand & Concrete, Inc., 56 T.C. 522, 530 (1971), aff'd,
462 F.2d 805 (10th Cir. 1972), where the Tax Court wrote: "[O]ur decision today does not
necessarily require that a transaction considered a distribution in complete liquidation within
the meaning of section 332 for the purpose of applying section 334(b)(2) may not be considered a reorganization under section 368(a)(1)(A) for some other unrelated purpose."
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(6)

Summary

At best, determining the legislative intent behind section 337
is of little aid in determining whether FEC was decided correctly,
for it appears that Congress never consciously considered the question raised in FEC. A study of the congressional history, however,
does at least aid in determining that Congress' only motive in enacting section 337 was to avoid the Court Holding Co. problem, and a
comparison of the "complete liquidation" requirements of several
sections indicates that Congress did not intend that term to require,
in all cases, a complete cessation of business at the corporate level.
B.

The ReincorporationCases as Precedent

Although the liquidation-reincorporation line of cases appears
adamant that section 337 should never apply to a sale as part of a
reorganization, those cases provide no more assistance in determining whether FEC was correctly decided than does the legislative
intent. First, in each of the reincorporation cases holding that section 337 could not apply to a sale as part of a reorganization, the
taxpayers rested their case solely on the argument that no reorganization had occurred. In Ralph C. Wilson90 the taxpayers conceded
that section 337 would not apply to a sale made as a step in a
reorganization, 9 ' and the Retail Properties,Inc.9 2 and James Armour, Inc. 3 decisions ignored the question whether section 337
might ever apply to a sale made to a third party as part of a reorganization.9 Thus, in these early cases in which section 368(a)(1)(D)
was being stretched to cover a type of transaction that it was hardly
meant to fit, the litigants naturally focused on the scope of section
368 and ignored the secondary issues raised by a finding that a
reorganization had in fact occurred.
Second, even if the reincorporation cases are taken at face value
to hold that a transaction must be a reorganization or a liquidation
but never both, and therefore, that section 337 may never apply in
a reorganization, TASCO clearly reopens consideration of this traditional interpretation of the meaning of "complete liquidation." If a
transaction may be neither a reorganization nor a liquidation under
the TASCO facts, arguably, under other circumstances a transac90.
91.
92.
93.
94.

46 T.C. 334 (1966).
See note 30 supra.
33 T.C.M. (P.H) q 64,245 (1964).
43 T.C. 295 (1964).
See note 37 supra and accompanying text.
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tion might be both a reorganization and a liquidation. 5
Finally, even if TASCO is discounted as an aberration, the
liquidation-reincorporation cases provide little assistance in determining whether section 337 can ever apply to a reorganization because each clearly is distinguishable from the facts in FEC. First,
FEC is different than the majority of liquidation-reincorporation
cases because the taxpayer had no tax avoidance motive in FEC.In
the typical liquidation-reincorporation case, the taxpayers attempt
to apply section 337 nonrecognition treatment to a sale made by one
corporation to a second corporation, both of which are controlled by
the same shareholders. The shareholders then attempt to obtain
capital gains treatment under section 331 on the distribution to
them by the "liquidating" corporation. If the court decides to treat
this tax-avoidance transaction as a reorganization, then section 337
should not apply because no true "sale or exchange" as required by
section 337 has occurred. Moreover, since a "sale," has not taken
place no factual problem arises whether the corporation or the
shareholders made the sale; thus section 337 need not be applied.
Also if the transaction is found to be a reorganization, section 361
will apply to the transfer of assets between the corporations, and the
cases consistently have held that when sections 361 and 337 conflict,
section 361 controls. Thus such cases may be understood as holding not that section 337 can never apply in a reorganization but that
a transaction that in substance is neither a liquidation nor a sale
cannot be called a sale merely to take advantage of sections 331 and
337. The majority of the liquidation-reincorporation cases are
thereby distinguished. But what about those few cases in which the
alleged section 337 sale was made to a third party? Arguably, those
cases also should be distinguished from the type C reorganization
involved in FEC. In all the reincorporation cases in which the court
found a type D or F reorganization, the shareholders of the acquired
corporation owned substantially all the stock of the acquiring corporation.9 7 Even in TASCO, a nonliquidation theory case, the shareholders of the first corporation owned approximately 85 percent of
the second corporation. On the other hand, after the type C reorgan95. Such an argument rests on the idea that TASCO broke with traditional statutory
interpretation for policy reasons. The court in TASCO determined that §§ 331 and 337 should
not apply to the facts before it even though a reorganization arguably had not occurred. If
another court faced with different facts decided on policy grounds that § 337 should apply
even though a reorganization had taken place, TASCO would stand as authority for again
breaking with the traditional view of the relaionship between § 337 and the reorganization
provisions.
96. Brrrva & EvusEc, supra note 20, at 11.67.
97. See notes 43 & 70 supra.
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ization in FEC, the assets of Fanon no longer were controlled by the
old Fanon shareholders, who owned less than 20 percent of the stock
of Whittaker Corporation. This difference in control clearly is important for purposes of determining whether a "complete liquidation" occurred. The Service routinely rules that a "complete liquidation" has occurred and that section 337 applies to a sale if a
corporation adopts a plan of complete liquidation and sells all its
assets to another corporation in which the shareholders of the selling
corporation own less than 20 percent of the stock. 8 The holding in
FEC that section 337 could not apply to the type C reorganization
because Fanon's business had not ceased and Fanon's shareholders
had not terminated their investment in the corporate enterprise
obviously is inconsistent with these rulings. Thus the conclusion
that the term "complete liquidation" may be inappropriate to describe a transaction involving 80 percent shareholder continuity
does not support FEC'sholding that a "complete liquidation" cannot occur when there is less than 20 percent shareholder continuity." This Note has demonstrated that although the liquidationreincorporation cases appear to support the traditional view that a
"complete liquidation" cannot occur during a reorganization, when
taken in context they are weak authority for the holding in FEC.110
98. See Rev. Proc. 69-6, 1969-1 C.B. 396. See also BrrrKER & Eusca, supra note 20,
11.67 at 11-77.
99. BrrrT= & EusncE, supranote 20, 11.67 implicitly adopts this distinction between
reincorporation reorganizations and bona fide reorganizations. That treatise states at 11-78:
A point to be noted in this context [discussion of liquidation-reincorporations],
however, is that § 337 is preempted by the reorganization provisions if the transaction
is held to constitute a reorganization rather than a liquidation. Moreover, it has been
held that § 337 is ousted of jurisdiction even over sales to outsiders in a liquidation
occurring in the course of a reorganization.
Paragraph 14.32, however, of that same treatise states at 14-81: "Use of § 337 to obtain
nonrecognition for gains realized on dealings with outsiders in the context of a reorganization
cum liquidation of the transferor does not seem to be prohibited by any express provisions of
the statute or by any compelling reasons of policy."
The apparent conflict can be resolved only by taking into account the context. The first
statement concerns liquidation-reincorporations in which courts have found reorganizations.
The second concerns bona fide reorganizations.
100. One final distinguishing factor should be considered at this point. Most of the
reincorporation transactions that were struck down by the courts involved gross attempts at
tax avoidance. E.g., Davant and TASCO. The transparency of these plans obviously affected
the decisions. In contrast, the Lammerts transaction, which also involved a high degree of
shareholder continuity, was upheld. At least one factor in the court's decision must have been
the fact that the instigator of the plan was dead and presumably would not have chosen to
go that far in order to obtain a "bail-out." FECdid not involve an obvious plan for avoiding
taxes, but was a bona fide business transaction.
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C. Policy Analysis
Since neither the legislative history nor prior case law is determinative of the question raised in FEC concerning the applicability
of section 337 in a reorganization, the courts are left with a problem
of characterization: what should "complete liquidation," as used in
section 337, mean? Should that term always include a sale and
liquidation as part of a reorganization? Should it ever include a sale
and liquidation as part of a reorganization? The only method available to determine what "complete liquidation" should mean is to
look to the policy behind section 337.
Frank W. Verito'0 ' furnishes authority for looking behind the
face of the statute in 6rder to determine its meaning. In that case
the taxpayer corporation adopted a plan of complete liquidation
and sold its assets. Due to its accountants' schedules, however, the
taxpayer could not close its books immediately, so it used the
money it had received upon the sale of assets to purchase marketable securities. Later within the year, taxpayer sold the securities,
claiming nonrecognition of gain under section 337, and distributed
the cash in complete liquidation. Although the Service conceded
that the literal requirements of section 337 had been satisfied, it
argued that the transactions did not "fall within the spirit of the
section."'0 2 The Tax Court disagreed:
[Tihe purpose of section 337 was to do away with the necessity of deciding
who made the sale as long as the corporation is in a state of complete liquidation and the sale [of property] takes place within a certain period of time.
Any result which would cause the question of taxation to once again depend

of the section have
upon who made the sale, where the formal requirements
3
been met, would be a direct violation of the section.
Thus the Verito court lodked to the consequences of holding that
section 337 would not apply to the facts before it and determined
that such a holding would reinstate the Court Holding Co.Cumberland Public Service Co. problem." 4
The Verito decision clearly indicates that a court faced with
101.
102.
103.
104.

43 T.C. 429 (1965), acq. 1965-2 C.B. 7.
43 T.C. at 436.
Id. at 440 (emphasis added).
The Verito court's version of the policy behind § 337 was as follows:

The purpose of section 337 is clear.

. .

. The purpose of the section was not to eliminate

one level of taxation. This could be done without the aid of section 337. United States
v. Cumberland Pub. Serv. Co., supra. The purpose of the section was aimed at eliminat-

ing the uncertainties attendant upon the Supreme Court decisions in CourtHolding Co.
and CumberlandPub. Serv. Co. and to make moot the question as to whether a sale of
assets was accomplished by the corporation or its stockholders.
Id. at 439.
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deciding whether section 337 should apply to a specific transaction
should look to see if a failure to apply section 337 would reinstate
the problem that section 337 was enacted to avoid." 5 Following the
authority of Verito, this Note will examine whether the FEC holding
raises factual problems similar to those that the anti-Court Holding
Co. statute was intended to prevent. 10 A series of illustrations' 7 will
be helpful in examining whether FEC's holding that section 337
should not apply to a type C reorganization reintroduces Court
Holding Co. problems.
Situation 1: Assume a type C reorganization in which corporation X transfers all its assets, in which it has a zero basis, to
corporation Y in exchange for 110 shares of Y stock, which has a fair
market value of $1100 ($10 per share). Corporation X then transfers
all 110 shares of Y stock to X's sole shareholder in exchange for all
his X stock, in which his basis is $1,000. As part of the exchange,
X's shareholder also assumes a $100 liability of corporation X. The
shareholder's basis in the 110 shares of Y stock will be $1,000 (basis
in X stock) plus $100 (liabilities assumed), or $1,100.111 If the shareholder sells 10 shares of the Y stock for $100 (fair market value) in
order to pay off the $100 liability and then sells the remaining 100
shares for $1,000 (fair market value), his total gain on the sales will
be zero dollars.
Situation 2: Now assume that instead of having the shareholder assume its liability, corporation X sells 10 shares of the Y
stock and discharges the $100 liability with the proceeds. Recall
that corporation X's basis in the Y stock is zero.
Comparison of tax treatmentunder FEC: In situation 1, neither corporation X nor its shareholder recognized gain on the sale
of the Y stock, but in situation 2, FEC would deny the use of section
337, and corporation X would recognize a gain of $100.
105. See also Kamis Engineering Co., 60 T.C. 763, 767 (1973). "It is essential that...
the overall purpose of section 337. . . be kept clearly in mind."
106. One way of viewing the policy analysis demonstrated by Verito is the "parity"
approach to § 337. Since the primary purpose of § 337 was to eliminate the Court Holding
Co.-Cumberland Public Service Co. problem, many commentators have suggested that the
courts interpret § 337 so that a sale of assets by the corporation just before liquidation will
be taxed as if the shareholders had sold the assets after liquidation; thus a parity approach
has arisen between the tax treatment of sales under § 337 and distributions in kind under §
336.
107. The following illustrations are borrowed from substantially similar illustrations in
Plaintiff's Brief in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment at 7-10, FEC Liquidating Corp.
v. United States.
108. The assumption of the liability by the shareholder does not result in recognition
of gain to X. Rev. Rul. 70-271, 1970-1 C.B. 166. The stock that the shareholder receives is
stock received in exchange for stock under § 354(a)(1) and will have a basis in the shareholder's hands determined under § 358(a).
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Obviously the economics of the two situations are identical, yet
the tax treatment depends on whether the corporation or the shareholder made the sale. Furthermore, if corporation X arranged the
sale for the shareholder prior to distributing the stock and the liability to him, the tax result presumably would vary according to the
degree of X's participation in the sale under Court Holding Co. and
Cumberland Public Service Co., even though section 337 would
have eliminated the need for determining who made the sale. Furthermore, the same problem would arise if the shareholder had a low
basis in his stock.
Situation3: If the shareholder's basis in his X stock had been
$10 ($1 per share) and he had assumed the $100 liability, his total
basis in the 110 shares of Y would have been $110 (carryover basis
plus liability assumed). Upon selling 10 shares of Y stock for $100
in order to pay the liability, the shareholder would recognize a gain
of $90. When he sold the remaining 100 shares for $1,000, he would
recognize a further gain of $900. Thus the total gain recognized
would be $990.
Situation 4: If, however, corporation X discharged the $100
liability by selling 10 shares of the Y stock for $100, X would recognize a $100 gain. When corporation X then distributes the remaining 100 shares to the shareholder (his total basis will be $10), who
sells all 100 shares for $1,000, the shareholder will recognize a further gain of $990.
Comparisonof tax treatment under FEC: Thus the total gain
if the corporation sold the shares would be $1090 as opposed to a
gain of only $990 if the shareholder had made the sale. Note, however, that if section 337 applied, contrary to the holding in FEC,the
total amount of gain recognized would be $990 no matter whether
the corporation or the shareholder sold the shares. Therefore, when
viewed under the Verito policy standpoint, the FECdecision apparently was incorrect, for it reintroduced Court Holding Co. problems
into determinations of tax treatment.
VI.

A SmIAR IRS ARGUMENT REJECTED

In 1966 the Service made an argument in Commissionerv. Morris Trust'09 that philosophically is similar to the holding in FEC.In
the Morris Trust case, a state bank (corporation A) wished to merge
with a national bank (corporation B). In order to comply with banking laws, the state bank had to divest itself of its insurance business
109.

367 F.2d 794 (4th Cir. 1966).
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before the merger. To accomplish this divestiture, corporation A
transferred its insurance business to newly created corporation C in
exchange for all C's stock. Corporation A then "spun-off" the C
stock to A's shareholders" and merged with B. The Service argued
that because the "spin-off' was a preliminary step to the merger,
A's shareholders could not use section 355 to avoid recognizing their
gain upon receipt of the C stock. The government conceded that the
"spin-off" of the insurance business would qualify as a type D reorganization, provided that the distribution of the C stock qualified for
nonrecognition treatment under section 355. The Commissioner,
however, finding "an inherent incompatibility in substantially simultaneous divisive and amalgamating reorganizations," ' argued
that section 355(b) (1) (A)'s active trade or business requirement had
not been met because A's banking business had not been continued
in unaltered form. The court, however, looked to the purpose behind
the active trade or business requirement-to prevent "bail-outs" of
liquid assets. Finding in this transaction "no attempt to recast a
taxable transaction in nontaxable form and no withdrawal of liquid
assets,"112 the court determined that section 355 should apply.113
Thus the court found that almost simultaneous divisive and amalgamating reorganizations are not incompatible if they do not create
a method for tax avoidance. The Commissioner's argument in FEC
that the liquidation provisions are inherently incompatible with the
reorganization provisioni obviously is similar to the argument that
the Morris Trust court rejected, and it seems equally unsupported
in tax policy.'
VII.

CONCLUSION

From the discussion above, it appears that the holding in FEC
LiquidatingCorp., that section 337 can never apply in a reorganiza110. The "spin-off" was accomplished under § 355.
111. 367 F.2d at 796.
112. Id. at 799.
113. The Commissioner conceded that the shareholders of X would have recognized no
gain had X merged into Y contemporaneously with the spin-off instead of after it. The court
determined, however, that Congress "did not intend the incidence of taxation to turn upon
so insubstantial a technicality." Id.
114. In a similar vein, a recent law review note determined that §§ 333 and 38(a))(C)
may apply concurrently. Note, Combining a Section 333 Liquidation with a "C"
Reorganization, 56 CoRNELL L. HEv. 665 (1971). The note presents an illustration in which a
corporation with no earnings and profits transfers substantially all of its assets to a larger
corporation in exchange for stock. The smaller corporation then liquidates, distributing its
remaining assets and the stock to its shareholder under § 333. The note concludes that the
transaction would qualify for tax free treatment both as to the reorganization and as to the
following liquidation.
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tion, takes an overly restrictive view of the term "complete liquidation." Section 337 should not be available in tax-avoidance
liquidation-reincorporations in which the alleged sale is made between two corporations that are controlled by the same shareholders. Whether section 337 should apply in a reorganization is not so
easily answered, however, when the sale is made to an unrelated
third party as part of a bona fide reorganization, especially if the
shareholders of the acquired corporation do not control the acquiring corporation subsequent to the reorganization.
Because the decision in FEC is so restrictive, the prudent
course will be for tax planners to structure transactions so that the
issue of section 337's applicability to a sale as part of a reorganization does not arise. One alternative would be for the acquiring corporation to assume the acquired corporation's liabilities. Another
method would be for the acquired corporation's shareholders to assume the acquired corporation's liabilities. Finally, the acquired
corporation might demand that the number of shares issued in exchange for the transferred assets be increased in order to cover the
tax that the acquired corporation will incur upon selling some of the
shares to satisfy its liabilities.
Even though a careful tax planner probably can avoid the holding of FEC, the case is of interest for at least two other reasons.
First, by the court's apparent adoption of the governments position
that section 337 can apply only to liquidations qualifying under
section 331, the court in effect has enacted the House version of
section 337. Although the House's approach to the Court Holding
Co. problem certainly is workable, it is not the statute that Congress
enacted in 1954. Second, the FEC decision may be viewed as a
lesson in statutory interpretation. When a court must characterize
a transaction as either within or outside a descriptive statutory
term, it should look to the policy consequences of its holding. The
court's failure in FECto consider the policy behind section 337 may
cause recurrences of the exact problem that section 337 was intended to prevent.
JAMs H. LoKEY, JR.

